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We present a generalized tomographic quantum key distribution protocol in which the two parties
share a Bell diagonal mixed state of two qubits. We show that if an eavesdropper performs a
coherent measurement on many quantum ancilla states simultaneously, classical methods of secure
key distillation are less effective than quantum entanglement distillation protocols. We also show
that certain Bell diagonal states are resistant to any attempt of incoherent eavesdropping.
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INTRODUCTION
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2]
is an important consequence of the application of the laws
of physics to information and communication theory. A
one-time pad provides perfect cryptographic security for
sending messages between two parties but relies on being
able to distribute a shared secret key [3, 4]. Classically, it
is impossible to amplify a set of shared randomness, but
quantum mechanics allows this to be done by the trans-
mission of quantum states [5]. The full power of quantum
cryptography rests on the ability to place upper bounds
on the knowledge of a potential eavesdropper (Eve) about
the distributed key shared by the legitimate parties (Al-
ice and Bob). In this paper we present a generalization of
the so-called tomographic quantum key distribution pro-
tocol [6]. We consider the situation where Alice and Bob
use qubits in a maximally entangled state distributed by
a central source. The qubits undergo a quantum channel
that converts the state to a Bell diagonal mixed state.
We analyze the security of this protocol under two
broad scenarios. In the first scenario, Alice and Bob
agree on a cryptographic key if the correlations between
their measurement results are stronger than any possi-
ble correlations between one of them and Eve, under the
assumption that Eve has full control over the source of
entangled qubits but she can only perform incoherent
measurements. The tomographic element of the protocol
allows Alice and Bob to compute the maximal strength
of correlations between Eve and any one of them. The
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner [8] theorem then guarantees that if the
correlations between Alice and Bob are stronger than
those between Eve and either of them, a secure key can
be established through one-way error correcting codes.
In the second scenario, we examine the situation when
Eve’s correlations are initially stronger than Alice and
Bob’s. It was shown that in some cases it is still possible
to obtain a secure key [9]. The idea is that by means of
two-way communication Alice and Bob can strengthen
their correlations with respect to Eve’s so that the CK
theorem can be applied again. This procedure is called
advantage distillation (AD).
There are two possible strategies for Eve within the
second scenario: incoherent and coherent measurements.
The first case was examined in [10] where it was shown
that advantage distillation is possible as long as the two-
qubit state shared by Alice and Bob is entangled. We
re-derive this result using different reasoning than the
one presented in [10].
In the second case, we show that the above result no
longer holds in the case of coherent measurements by
Eve. Indeed, if the qubits are affected by too many errors
(caused by Eve’s actions), advantage distillation fails de-
spite Alice and Bob still sharing an entangled state. In
such cases the only way for Alice and Bob to obtain a
secure key is to revert to quantum entanglement distilla-
tion.
TOMOGRAPHIC QKD
In a tomographic QKD scheme, a central source dis-
tributes entangled qubits to Alice and Bob. They inde-
pendently and randomly choose to measure three tomo-
graphically complete observables σx, σy and σz (Pauli
matrices) on each qubit. At the end of the transmission,
they publicly announce their choice of observables for
each qubit pair. They then proceed to divide their mea-
surement results according to those for which their mea-
surement bases match, and those for which their mea-
surement bases do not match. Exchanging a subset of
their measurements allows Alice and Bob to tomograph-
ically reconstruct the density operator of the two-qubit
state they share.
Ideally, in the absence of noise in the source or chan-
nels, they expect to receive the maximally entangled state
2|ψideal〉 = 1√
2
(|z0, z0〉+ |z1, z1〉) , (1)
where |zk〉 is the eigenstate of σz with the eigenvalue
(−1)k, and Alice (Bob) possesses the left (right) qubit.
The results for matching bases can then be used to gen-
erate a cryptographic key as they are either perfectly
correlated ( for x and z bases) or anti-correlated (for y
basis).
However, Alice and Bob cannot realistically expect to
obtain the maximally entangled state Eq. (1) because ei-
ther the source is not ideal, the channel conveying the
qubits is noisy, or there is an eavesdropper tampering
with the source. For security analysis, we assume that
Eve has total control over the source and that all the
errors are caused by her when she tries to extract infor-
mation about the key.
To constrain Eve’s information, Alice and Bob use part
of their measurements to perform full tomography on the
state distributed by the source. The protocol we consider
here is such that Alice and Bob agree to communicate if
and only if they see the Bell diagonal state
̺AB =
1∑
a,b=0
pab|zab〉〈zab|, (2)
where
|zab〉 = 1√
2
1∑
k=0
ωkb|zk, zk+a〉 (3)
and
∑1
a,b=0 pab = 1, ω = −1. Following the nomencla-
ture of [11] we call a the amplitude bit and b the phase
bit. Here, we assume that p00 >
1
2 [7].
The above state can be obtained from the maximally
entangled state Eq. (1) assuming that the travelling
qubits undergo bit and phase flips. The so-called Werner
state, i.e., the maximally entangled state with white
noise, is a special case where p01 = p10 = p11. There-
fore, the protocol presented here is more general than
the one studied in [6, 12] where only Werner states were
considered.
As Alice and Bob perform their measurements in the
three bases x, y and z, it is convenient to express the
state ̺AB in the x and y bases. This can easily be done
using the transformation rules on the Bell states,
|zab〉 = ωab|xba〉 = (−i)aωab|ya+b+1 a〉. (4)
Writing out (2) in the other bases, we have
̺AB =
1∑
a,b=0
pba|xab〉〈xab| =
1∑
a,b=0
pb a+b+1|yab〉〈yab|. (5)
We can then compute the probability of Alice and Bob
obtaining correlated results conditional on a particular
choice of basis:
Prob(correlation|x basis) = p00 + p11
Prob(correlation|y basis) = p01 + p10
Prob(correlation|z basis) = p00 + p11, (6)
and also the probability of getting anti-correlated results:
Prob(anti-correlation|x basis) = p01 + p10
Prob(anti-correlation|y basis) = p00 + p11
Prob(anti-correlation|z basis) = p01 + p10. (7)
Since p00 >
1
2 , Alice and Bob are more likely to ob-
tain correlated results when they measure in the x and
z bases, and anti-correlated results in the y basis; Alice
and Bob will thus make use of correlation to generate
their key when they measure in the x and z bases, and
anti-correlation to generate their key when in the y basis.
EAVESDROPPING
In order to obtain as much information as possible
about the key generated by Alice and Bob, Eve entangles
their qubits with ancilla states |eab〉 in her possession.
The best she can do is to prepare the following tripartite
pure state
|ψABE〉 =
1∑
a,b=0
√
pab|zab〉|eab〉, (8)
where 〈eab|ecd〉 = δa,cδb,d. Tracing out Eve gives the
mixed state Eq. (2) that Alice and Bob measures, and
this purification is the most general one as far as inco-
herent attacks are concerned.
Eve’s purifications, when expressed in different bases,
read
|ψABE〉 = 1√
2
1∑
k,a=0
|zk, zk+a〉
(
1∑
b=0
√
pabω
kb|eab〉
)
=
1√
2
1∑
k,a=0
|xk, xk+a〉
(
1∑
b=0
√
pbaω
kbωab|eba〉
)
=
1√
2
1∑
k,a=0
|yk, yk+a〉
(
1∑
b=0
√
pb a+b+1(−i)bωkbωb(a+b+1)|eb a+b+1〉
)
,
(9)
3We can express Eq. (9) more conveniently as
|ψABE〉 =
1∑
k,a=0
√
pa
2
|zk, zk+a〉|fzka〉
=
1∑
k,a=0
√
qa
2
|xk, xk+a〉|fxka〉
=
1∑
k,a=0
√
ra
2
|yk, yk+a〉|fyka〉, (10)
where
pa =
1∑
b=0
pab
qa =
1∑
b=0
pba
ra =
1∑
b=0
pb a+b+1 (11)
and the normalized kets
|fzka〉 =
1√
pa
1∑
b=0
√
pabω
kb|eab〉
|fxka〉 =
1√
qa
1∑
b=0
√
pbaω
kbωab|eba〉
|fyka〉 =
1√
ra
1∑
b=0
√
pb a+b+1(−i)bωkbωb(a+b+1)|eb a+b+1〉
(12)
are such that their inner products are given by
〈fz0a|fz1a〉 =
pa0 − pa1
pa0 + pa1
≡ λza
〈fx0a|fx1a〉 =
p0a − p1a
p0a + p1a
≡ λxa
〈fy0a|fy1a〉 =
p0 a+1 − p1a
p0 a+1 + p1a
≡ λya. (13)
The ancillas with different a’s are orthogonal.
Eve’s eavesdropping strategy proceeds as follows. Af-
ter Alice and Bob announce their measurement bases,
Eve knows on which pairs of qubits they measured the
same observables and that her ancilla is a mixture of
four possible states. Formally this can be viewed as a
transmission of information from Alice and Bob to Eve
encoded in the quantum state of Eve’s ancilla. To find
the optimal eavesdropping strategy, she has to maximize
this information transfer by a choice of a suitable gener-
alized measurement known as a Positive Operator Value
Measure (POVM). For example, if Alice and Bob mea-
sured in the x basis, Eve will obtain the following mixed
state of her ancilla,
̺xE =
1∑
k,a=0
qa
2
|fxka〉〈fxka|. (14)
This is equivalent to Alice and Bob “communicating” to
Eve that they measured {00, 01, 10, 11} by sending her
the quantum states {|fx00〉, |fx01〉, |fx11〉, |fx10〉} with prior
probabilities { q02 , q12 , q12 , q02 } respectively. Eve has to
find the optimal measurement that will extract from the
transmission as much information as possible, called the
accessible information. Note that this is not equivalent
to finding a measurement that minimizes the error of dis-
tinguishing between these states [15].
INCOHERENT ATTACK
We first assume that Eve carries out an incoherent at-
tack in which she performs measurements on her ancillas
one at a time. In contrast, in a coherent attack, she
would measure joint observables of more than one an-
cilla, or construct her initial state Eq. (8) so that more
than one pair of qubits were entangled with each ancilla.
The ancilla states for each basis can be divided into
two groups. The first group corresponds to a = 0 and
refers to the case when Alice and Bob obtain correlated
results. The second group corresponds to the case a = 1
and refers to the case when Alice and Bob obtain anti-
correlated results.
For example, if Alice and Bob both measure in the y
basis, Eve will have the state
̺
y
E =
1∑
k,a=0
ra
2
|fyka〉〈fyka|. (15)
The first group a = 0 occurs with probability r0 and the
second group a = 1 occurs with probability r1. Similarly,
if they measure in the x (z) basis, the first group occurs
with probability q0 (p0) while the second group occurs
with probability q1 (p1). The ancillas in the first group
|fmk0〉 (m = x, y, z) are orthogonal to those in the second
group |fmk1〉.
For the purpose of applying the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner theo-
rem, we need only to compute the mutual information
between Eve and Bob and compare this with the mutual
information between Alice and Bob; Eve would have to
optimize her measurements on her ancilla so that it max-
imizes the information she gains about Bob’s measure-
ment results.
Let us now present the POVMmeasurement that max-
imizes the information transferred by Bob to Eve. In the
first step, Eve sorts the mixture of the ancillas into two
sub-ensembles according to the index a. This can easily
be done using a projective measurement. This sorting is
an auxiliary step as, at this stage, she does not gain any
4more information about the result of Bob’s measurement.
After that, depending on the outcome of the projection
(a = 0 or a = 1), Eve has an equiprobable mixture of
two non-orthogonal ancilla states each corresponding to
Alice and Bob’s result. For example, if the chosen mea-
surement basis was the z basis, Eve will receive the mixed
state
̺zE =
1∑
k,a=0
pa
2
|fzka〉〈fzka|. (16)
Projecting into either the a = 0 or a = 1 orthogonal
subspaces (depending on Alice and Bob’s measurement
outcomes), she will obtain one of the two equiprobable
mixtures of non-orthogonal ancilla states
̺z0 =
1
2
|fz00〉〈fz00|+
1
2
|fz10〉〈fz10| if Alice and Bob obtained
correlated results, a = 0;
̺z1 =
1
2
|fz01〉〈fz01|+
1
2
|fz11〉〈fz11| if Alice and Bob obtained
anti-correlated results, a = 1.
(17)
Next, she applies the measurement that maximizes the
accessible information encoded in the mixture of the two
ancilla states given by the outcome of her projective mea-
surement. In the case of two equally likely states, this
optimum measurement is given by the so-called square-
root measurement [13, 14]. The outcome probabilities of
the square-root measurement are
ηxa =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− (λxa)2
)
ηya =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− (λya)2
)
ηza =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− (λza)2
)
, (18)
where ηma is the probability of correctly inferring a given
ancilla state in the m basis (m = x, y, z). The index
a refers to the correlation/anti-correlation subspace in
which the ancilla lies.
It is straightforward to compute the mutual informa-
tion between Bob and Eve:
IBE =
1
3
IxBE +
1
3
I
y
BE +
1
3
IzBE , (19)
where ImBE is the mutual information when Alice and Bob
measure in the same basis m. We have
IxBE = q0 (1−H(ηx0 )) + q1 (1−H(ηx1 ))
I
y
BE = r0 (1−H(ηy0 )) + r1 (1−H(ηy1 ))
IzBE = p0 (1−H(ηz0)) + p1 (1−H(ηz1)) . (20)
Here, H(ηma ) = −ηma log2 ηma − (1 − ηma ) log2 (1− ηma ) is
the binary entropy of the respective probability distribu-
tions. Also, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is given by
IAB = 1− 1
3
(H(p0) +H(q0) +H(r0)) . (21)
We are interested in the conditions for which our pro-
tocol is secure against Eve’s incoherent eavesdropping at-
tack. Now, even if Eve obtains some information about
the transmitted key through her incoherent measure-
ment, Alice and Bob can still obtain a secure key with a
few additional steps. According to the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
(CK) theorem, a secure key can be generated from a
raw key sequence by means of a suitably chosen error-
correcting code and classical one-way communication be-
tween Alice and Bob if the mutual information between
Alice and Bob exceeds that between Eve and either one
of them (the CK regime). For the protocol considered,
the mutual information between Alice and Eve, and Bob
and Eve, are the same so that security is assured as long
as
IAB > IBE . (22)
QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT DISTILLATION
If there is too much noise in the two-qubit state, the
CK theorem is not immediately applicable. Instead, Al-
ice and Bob need to either select a subsequence of their
bit values in a systematic way or pre-process their two-
qubit state before measuring, so that the CK theorem is
applicable once more. One method of doing this is quan-
tum entanglement distillation (QED), a quantum proce-
dure by which many weakly entangled qubit pairs are
distilled into a smaller number of more strongly entan-
gled qubit pairs by means of local operations and classical
communication.
Alice and Bob’s two-qubit state Eq. (2) can be distilled
successfully using local operations and classical commu-
nication as long as they satisfy the Peres–Horodecki par-
tial transposition criterion [17]: A two-qubit state ̺ is
quantum distillable if and only if it is a non-positive
partial transposed (NPPT) state. A state ̺ is NPPT
if ̺TB 6≥ 0 so that it has at least one negative eigen-
value. Here, ̺TB denotes the transposition with respect
to Bob’s basis only. The partial transpose of each of our
Bell states gives,
|zkl〉〈zkl| −→ 1
2
− |zk+1 l+1〉〈zk+1 l+1|. (23)
Applying the Peres–Horodecki criterion to our Bell di-
agonal mixture, we find that the state Eq. (2) is quantum
distillable provided that
max
ab
pab >
1
2
. (24)
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Instead of manipulating their qubits in QED, Alice and
Bob can process the raw key sequence they have estab-
lished in the protocol in order to obtain a more secure
key sequence. One such procedure is known as advantage
distillation (AD).
In the AD protocol, Alice and Bob divide their raw key
sequence into blocks of length L. For each block, Alice
generates a random bit and adds this, modulo 2, to each
bit of the block. She then sends this processed block to
Bob via a public channel. After receiving the block, Bob
subtracts his corresponding block from it (modulo 2). If
all the bit values are the same, it is a deemed a good
block. Otherwise it is a bad block. Bob then informs
Alice whether the block he received was good or bad. If
it is a good block, Alice will record the random bit she
initially generated into her distilled bit sequence while
Bob enters into his distilled sequence the common bit
value he found after subtraction. If it is a bad block,
they will both reject the bits and it plays no further part
in the distillation procedure.
Now for a good block, two cases can occur:
(I) Alice and Bob’s distilled bits are the same;
(II) Alice and Bob’s distilled bits are different.
Case (I) occurs when Alice and Bob started out with an
identical raw block (i.e. their length L blocks are perfectly
correlated). On the other hand, Case (II) occurs when
Alice and Bob start out with raw L-blocks that are anti-
correlated with each other.
Now, for large L, there will be approximately L3 bits
in the good block that result from Alice and Bob’s
z basis measurement. For these, p0 is the probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob obtain correlated results while
p1 is the probability that they obtain anti-correlated
results. Similarly, L3 bits will result from x (y) ba-
sis measurement — q0 (r0) is the probability that Al-
ice and Bob obtain correlated results while q1 (r1) is
the probability that they obtain anti-correlated results.
Thus for a good block, Case (I) occurs with probabil-
ity
p
L/3
0
q
L/3
0
r
L/3
1
p
L/3
0
q
L/3
0
r
L/3
1
+p
L/3
1
q
L/3
1
r
L/3
0
while Case (II) occurs with
probability
p
L/3
1
q
L/3
1
r
L/3
0
p
L/3
0
q
L/3
0
r
L/3
1
+p
L/3
1
q
L/3
1
r
L/3
0
(remember that for
the y basis, Alice and Bob generate their raw key from
anti-correlation, which corresponds to probability r1).
The error rate for Alice and Bob (the proportion of Case
(II) blocks) is given by
EAB =
p
L/3
1 q
L/3
1 r
L/3
0
p
L/3
0 q
L/3
0 r
L/3
1 + p
L/3
1 q
L/3
1 r
L/3
0
, (25)
which for L ≫ 1, p1 < p0 and q1 < q0 (since p00 > 12 ) is
approximately
EAB ≈
(
p1q1r0
p0q0r1
)L/3
. (26)
Eve is able to intercept the processed blocks that Alice
sends to Bob via the classical channel. From their public
communication, she will also be able to know which of
the blocks are accepted or rejected. For the good blocks,
she has to deduce the distilled bit for each block. To
do this, she can either resort to incoherent or coherent
measurements on her ancillas.
Incoherent Attack on Advantage Distillation
In the incoherent attack, Eve performs a square root
measurement to distinguish her ancillas one by one and,
from her results, tries to deduce what Alice and Bob mea-
sured for each entry in an L-block. She then subtracts
Alice’s transmitted block from her own corresponding
block, as Bob does. Typically, Eve’s block will be inho-
mogeneous after subtraction so she decides by majority
voting which bit value to assign to a particular block –
she bets on the value which occurs most frequently in her
block, and if there are the same number of 0s as 1s, she
picks one of them at random.
Consider Case (I) blocks, i.e. Alice and Bob start out
with correlated raw blocks. From her square-root mea-
surement, Eve guesses each entry in the block correctly
with the following probabilities:
• ηx0 if Alice and Bob measured in the x basis;
• ηy1 if they measured in the y basis;
• ηz0 if they measured in the z-basis.
She guesses an entry incorrectly with probabilities
• 1− ηx0 if Alice and Bob measured in the x basis;
• 1− ηy1 if they measured in the y basis;
• 1− ηz0 if they measured in the z-basis.
Because Eve applies majority voting, she makes errors
whenever she guesses more than half of the entries in a
block wrongly. If the same number of 0s and 1s appear in
her guesses, she picks one of them at random and makes
errors half of the time. We can thus compute Eve’s error
6rate:
E
(I)
BE =
∑
∑
i ei>
L
2
(
L
3
ex
)
(1− ηx0 )ex(ηx0 )
L
3
−ex
×
(
L
3
ey
)
(1− ηy1 )ey (ηy1 )
L
3
−ey
×
(
L
3
ez
)
(1 − ηz0)ez (ηz0)
L
3
−ez
+
1
2
∑
∑
i ei=
L
2
(
L
3
ex
)
(1− ηx0 )ex(ηx0 )
L
3
−ex
×
(
L
3
ey
)
(1− ηy1 )ey (ηy1 )
L
3
−ey
×
(
L
3
ez
)
(1 − ηz0)ez (ηz0)
L
3
−ez , (27)
where ei is the number of errors made in the i
th basis.
The second summation arises from the situation when
Eve has to assign 0 or 1 at random to the block because
the number of 0s and 1s in the block are equal.
For L ≫ 1, we can lower bound the summations in
Eq. (27) by approximating them with the main con-
tributing terms, i.e., terms for which the binomial factor(
L
3
em
)
, (m = x, y, z) has its peak:
E
(I)
BE ∼
(
L
3
L
6
)
(1− ηx0 )
L
6 (ηx0 )
L
6
×
(
L
3
L
6
)
(1− ηy1 )
L
6 (ηy1 )
L
6
×
(
L
3
L
6
)
(1− ηz0)
L
6 (ηz0)
L
6 . (28)
By applying Stirling’s approximation we have
E
(I)
BE ∼ 2L (ηx0ηy1ηz0(1− ηx0 )(1 − ηy1 )(1− ηz0))
L
6 . (29)
Similarly for Case (II) blocks in which Alice and Bob
start out with anti-correlated raw blocks, we can obtain
the error rate for Eve:
E
(II)
BE ∼ 2L (ηx1ηy0ηz1(1− ηx1 )(1− ηy0 )(1− ηz1))
L
6 . (30)
Finally, the total error rate for Eve is given by
EBE ∼ p
L
3
0 q
L
3
0 r
L
3
1
p
L
3
0 q
L
3
0 r
L
3
1 + p
L
3
1 q
L
3
1 r
L
3
0
E
(I)
BE
+
p
L
3
1 q
L
3
1 r
L
3
0
p
L
3
0 q
L
3
0 r
L
3
1 + p
L
3
1 q
L
3
1 r
L
3
0
E
(II)
BE (31)
Since the coefficient in front of E
(I)
BE goes to 1 while
the coefficient in front of E
(II)
BE goes to 0, we are left with
EBE ≈ 2L (ηx0ηy1ηz0(1− ηx0 )(1 − ηy1 )(1− ηz0))
L
6 . (32)
By comparing the error rates [9], we can obtain the
condition for AD to be successful under an incoherent
attack:
lim
L→∞
EAB
EBE
< 1 (33)
which reduces to
p1
p0
q1
q0
r0
r1
< 8
√
ηx0η
y
1η
z
0(1− ηx0 )(1 − ηy1 )(1− ηz0). (34)
For the special case of Werner states (p01 = p10 =
p11 =
1−p00
3 , so that p0 = q0 = r1, p1 = q1 = r0 and
ηx0 = η
y
1 = η
z
0), we find that Eq. (34) reduces to
p1
p0
< 2
√
ηz0(1 − ηz0). (35)
A similar result was obtained by Bruß et al. [12].
Coherent Attack on Advantage Distillation
We consider a particularly simple scheme of coherent
attack that is similar to that presented in [16]. Eve’s
strategy is as follows.
For each good block, Eve has a corresponding set of
ancilla states and rather than measuring her ancillas one-
by-one (an incoherent attack), she performs a joint mea-
surement on all L of them to acquire knowledge about
the value that Alice assigned to the block. By also mak-
ing use of the classical information that is exchanged be-
tween Alice and Bob during the distillation process, Eve
can learn a lot more than if she were to measure her
ancillas one by one.
Consider first a Case (I) block. As an example, sup-
pose that Alice and Bob start out with the same block
01001 for L = 5, and Alice’s random bit is 1. After ad-
dition (modulo 2), she sends the processed block 10110
to Bob via the public channel which Eve is able to inter-
cept. Eve can also project her block of ancilla states into
the orthogonal subspace corresponding to Alice and Bob
having a correlated or anti-correlated block. Doing this,
she can know that Alice and Bob started out with the
same raw blocks (i.e. Case (I) blocks). From this, Eve
can then deduce the following possibilities:
1. If Alice’s random bit is ‘0’, Alice and Bob must
have started out with raw blocks 10110. If Alice
and Bob had measured in the bases x, y, y, z, x for
the respective entries in the block, the ancilla state
that she holds will be |fx11〉|fy01〉|fy10〉|fz11〉|fx00〉.
2. If Alice’s random bit is ‘1’, Alice and Bob must have
started out with raw blocks 01001. If x, y, y, z, x
is the order of basis measurements for the en-
tries, the ancilla state that she holds will then be
|f (x)00 〉|fy10〉|fy01〉|fz00〉|fx11〉.
7The mutual inner product between the two ancilla states
is (λx0 )
nx(λy1)
ny (λz0)
nz , where na is the number of times
the basis a was measured. The optimal measurement to
distinguish these two states is again the square root mea-
surement. In general, for each Case (I) block of length L,
Eve needs to distinguish just 2 possible L-ancilla states
with mutual inner product (λx0)
nx(λy1)
ny (λz0)
nz .
Now, for large L, we have nx, ny, nz ≈ L3 . Eve’s prob-
ability of correctly inferring a particular L-ancilla state
is given by
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− (λx0λy1λz0)
2L
3
)
≈ 1− 1
4
(λx0λ
y
1λ
z
0)
2L
3 . (36)
Her error rate for Case (I) blocks is thus
E
(I)
BE ≈
1
4
(λx0λ
y
1λ
z
0)
2L
3 . (37)
Similarly when we consider Case (II) blocks, Eve’s er-
ror rate is
E
(II)
BE ≈
1
4
(λx1λ
y
0λ
z
1)
2L
3 . (38)
Eve’s total error rate is thus
EBE =
p
L
3
0 q
L
3
0 r
L
3
1
p
L
3
0 q
L
3
0 r
L
3
1 + p
L
3
1 q
L
3
1 r
L
3
0
E
(I)
BE
+
p
L
3
1 q
L
3
1 r
L
3
0
p
L
3
0 q
L
3
0 r
L
3
1 + p
L
3
1 q
L
3
1 r
L
3
0
E
(II)
BE
≈ 1
4
(λx0λ
y
1λ
z
0)
2L
3 (39)
since once again, the coefficient in front of E
(I)
BE goes to
1 while the coefficient in front of E
(II)
BE goes to 0.
Finally by comparing error rates (Eq. (33)), we obtain
the condition for AD to be possible under a coherent
attack by Eve:
p1
p0
q1
q0
r0
r1
< (λx0λ
y
1λ
z
0)
2
. (40)
DISCUSSION
We now analyze the above results. A Bell diagonal
density matrix is characterized by four real parameters
and a normalization condition so we can parameterize
such a state by the probability p00 (the amount of the
state |z00〉 in the Bell mixture) and two angles θ, φ char-
acterizing the remaining three probabilities p01, p10, p11:
p01 = (1− p00) cos2 θ cos2 φ
p10 = (1− p00) sin2 θ cos2 φ
p11 = (1− p00) sin2 φ. (41)
This means that for a fixed p00, all the quantities such as
IAB, IBE , EAB, EBE for incoherent and coherent attacks
are two-argument functions.
First, for each p00 we can plot a region character-
izing all the Bell diagonal states which lead to secure
raw keys. As long as p00 is greater than around 0.765
all corresponding states are secure. Below this, fewer
and fewer states are secure (white regions in Fig. 1)
until, for p00 =
1
2 , the Bell diagonal mixture becomes
separable and no secret bits can be obtained. Even
then we can still identify certain states that are resis-
tant against incoherent eavesdropping as long as p00
is greater than half. These are states of the form
p00|z00〉〈z00| + p01|z01〉〈z01|, p00|z00〉〈z00| + p10|z10〉〈z10|
and p00|z00〉〈z00|+ p11|z11〉〈z11|. It is interesting to note
that this threshold of 0.765, below which it is no longer
possible to generate secure keys for every state, is the
same threshold as that for the Werner state — this means
that the Werner state will be the first state to become
insecure as the p00 threshold is exceeded.
Second, using Eq. (34) we verified the results presented
in [10], namely that QED is equivalent to AD if Eve
can only perform incoherent attacks. In other words,
as long as p00 is greater than
1
2 , Alice and Bob do not
need QED because AD works equally well and does not
require collective operations on qubits, which are difficult
to realize experimentally.
However, if Eve is capable of carrying out a coherent
attack, QED is much more powerful than AD (Fig. 2).
We see that as p00 → 12 , more states fall into the black
regions where AD fails and only QED is possible. As
before, the same states that are resistant to incoherent
attack in the CK regime are resistant to the above co-
herent attack on AD.
CONCLUSION
We have generalized the tomographic QKD scheme to
Bell diagonal states and analyzed its resistance to various
eavesdropping attacks, both in the CK regime and when
Alice and Bob perform advantage distillation. We have
shown the inequivalence of advantage distillation and en-
tanglement distillation in the presence of coherent mea-
surement by a potential eavesdropper. It still remains to
be seen whether Eve can further increase her information
gain by entangling more than one pair of Alice and Bob’s
qubits with her ancilla.
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FIG. 1: Comparison of secure regions for the protocol for different values of p00 under an incoherent attack. White regions in
the plot represent states that are secure against incoherent attacks by Eve in the scenario when Alice and Bob do not attempt
AD or QED (CK regime). When p00 →
1
2
the white areas disappear with the exception of the certain points that never become
black. These points correspond to the states p00|z00〉〈z00| + p01|z01〉〈z01| (θ = 0, φ = 0), p00|z00〉〈z00| + p10|z10〉〈z10| (θ =
pi
2
,
φ = 0) and p00|z00〉〈z00| + p11|z11〉〈z11| (φ =
pi
2
). These states are resistant to any incoherent attack. As reference, the grey
areas (exaggerated in the figure) indicate Werner states.
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FIG. 2: Comparison of secure regions in advantage distillation for different values of p00 under a coherent attack. White regions
in the plot represent states that are secure against coherent attacks by Eve in the scenario when Alice and Bob perform AD.
Black regions correspond to states for which AD fails under coherent attack. As the state becomes more mixed (p00 →
1
2
), the
white areas disappear with the exception of the certain points that never become black. As with the CK regime for p00 →
1
2
,
the surviving states are p00|z00〉〈z00|+p01|z01〉〈z01| , p00|z00〉〈z00|+p10|z10〉〈z10| and p00|z00〉〈z00|+p11|z11〉〈z11|. In comparison,
with only incoherent attacks all states with p00 >
1
2
are secure. As reference, the grey areas (exaggerated in the figure) refer to
Werner states.
